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Two Views on North Carolina's Waste Management Dilemma
Interviews with Dr. Bernard Greenberg, Chairman of the
Governor's Task Force on Hazardous Waste Management, and
Bill Cummings, a leader of the Protect Our Piedmont Coalition
The Resource Conservation and "ecovery
Act of 1976 requires each state to develop a
comprehensive waste management system,
providing the public adequate protection from
the hazards of storing, transporting, and
disposing toxic and low-level radioactive
wastes. North Carolina's new "cradle-to-
grave" waste tracking system is beginning to
monitor waste generation and transport. But
many hazardous waste materials pose management
questions far beyond transport: some may be
recycled or detoxified; others need storage for
a number of years; still others require perma-
nent storage and are practically a permanent
threat. To deal with a host of technical and
administrative concerns to be addressed in
creating a comprehensive waste management
system, Governor Hunt's Task Force on Waste
Management began meeting in August 1980. A
final report was submitted to the Governor
in March, with legislative recommendations
for the 1931 General Assembly.
Chairman of the Task Force is its sole
representative from higher education, Dr.
Bernard G. Greenberg, Dean of the School of
Public Health at the University of North
Carolina-Chapel Hill. Dr. Greenberg was
interviewed January 30, in the period between
the Task Force's public presentation of its
draft, and its post-draft deliberations for
the final report.
oarolina planning : In your estimation, just
how serious is North Carolina's
hazardous waste problem?
Greenberg: Every state has a hazardous waste
problem. North Carolina is now the
tenth most populous state, yet it
generates an amount of low-level
radioactive waste which places it
fourth in the nation. The primary
reason for that is we generate a
lot of electricity in this state by
nuclear energy, and when Duke
Power's Magui re Plant goes into
operation, the waste load will be
even larger than it is now. Another
reason is that the fuel rods used
in these nuclear energy olants are
manufactured in a plant in Wilming-
ton, by General Electric. They
account for something like 88% of
the low-level radioactive waste.
The other 12% comes from hospitals,
medical schools, research institutes.
Low-level radioactive materials are
used for tracer studies, for
diagnostic work, for therapy in the
hospital, and so on. All of that
stuff -- the gloves, the clothes,
the paper, the syringes, the test-
tubes -- everything that's used,
once it comes in contact with radio-
active material, automatically
becomes radioactive. So even if we
didn't have this large amount of
radioactive waste from the nuclear
energy industry, the state would
still have 25,000 cubic feet per
year of low-level radioactive waste




a p: Along with nuclear waste, the Task
Force is also dealing with non-
radioactive hazardous waste. Is
there a basic difference in the way
the two types of wastes should be
handl ed?
Greenberg: Oh, absolutely -- they're entirely
different. Low-level radioactive
waste has to be handled in a
different way. Some of it can be
stored. If the half-life is short
enough, the material becomes almost
completely inactive within five or
six half-life periods. Other stuff,
like C]j,, has a half-life of 5700
years. If you wait six ha 1 f- 1 i f
e
periods, you're talking about
35"36,000 years, which means
permanent handling. But some of the
radioactive material, like tritium
that may be in your watch, is very
low-level and has a relatively short
1 ife.
As far as non- radi oact i ve toxic and
hazardous substances are concerned
-- these are chemicals, acids, some
solid, some fluid -- which have to
be handled quite differently. Some
of them are ignitable, like waste
motor oil, paints, solvents, and
many of the dyes used in the textile
industry. A lot of the material
is recoverable; it can be recycled.
Some are acids which are corrosive;
they'll burn through practically
anything. Some of them are toxic
substances, like PCBs and the
pesticides that are used in
agriculture. They have to be de-
££'
toxified, or somehow or other
handled in a permanent way; or at
least stored until the technology
is known to neutralize them or make
them innocuous. For example, the
PCBs that were illegally dumped on
North Carolina roads -- 210 miles
of them -- are still out there
because the technology isn't known
to detoxify them. Only about six
months ago, however, a company
developed an incineration process
for detoxifying PCB . But it has
to be done in a lab; we still don't
know how to do it on the road. I'm
sure the technique will be available
someday to detoxify it on the road --
maybe five years, maybe two years,
maybe ten years from now. It's
all in the process of development,
and until that technology is
available, we have to have a waste
management system whose basic
purpose is to prevent the formation
of waste, or to minimize the amount
to be buried or stored.
Did the Task Force consider suggest-
ing a moratorium on new industries
that generate significant quantities
of hazardous and radioactive wastes?
Greenbevg : No, the problem isn't going to go
away if you create a moratorium.
Even if you don't have any new
industry, you still have enough to
worry about the problem right now.
You can't stop industry or progress,
in the same way for example, that
people wanted to stop research on
recombinant DNA. Well, it turns
out now that the research on
recombinant DNA may be the greatest
breakthrough in science since the
atomic bomb, or atomic fusion or
fission. Now they're using genetic
engineering to manufacture insulin,
to manufacture interferon; they'll
probably use it to manufacture
various enzymes that may be useful
in immunology, and so on. You
don't stop science, and you can't
stop industry. I think a moratorium
is a non-viable solution to the
probl em.
c_ £_: What about investigating the type
of new industry that comes into
the state?
Bernard G. Greenberg. Photo by Harriet Barr
Greenberg: There already is a statute in the
books that was passed by the General
Assembly several years ago. Any
new industry that comes in has to
be investigated by the Departments
of Commerce and Natural Resources
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and Community Development (NRCDJ
.
Commerce attracts the new industry;
DNRCD is supposed to make sure that
the impact of that industry upon
the environment will not be
detrimental to the environment
or the health of the general
population. So that law is already
on the books.
£2_:
either through incineration on land
or at sea, or in some way detox-
ifying it, making it as neutral
as possible.
Some people have suggested that
products should have labels dis-
closing hazardous materials involved
in their manufacture.
£ 2J A 1979 survey for the U.S. House
Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigation includes a list of
125 North Carolina sites in which
industrial wastes have been
disposed since 1950. Shouldn't
the state's first order of business
be attention to these already
existing hazardous waste sites?
Greeriberg: As far as I know, the Solid and
Hazardous Waste Branch in the
Department of Human Resources knows
about all of these. They're all
presumably under surveillance and
being monitored by that unit.
They're not, I'm told by Mr.
Strickland, who's in charge of that
unit, hazardous enough that they
would even qualify for the federal
Superfund that was passed a few
months ago.
Our first order of business is to
create a system, which we don't
have, to coordinate the activities
of state government. We now have
a number of agencies which have
authority: the Commerce Department,
Crime Control and Public Safety,
Department of Human Resources, and
so on. We already have some
statutes, but they are not coordinated
or stringent enough. So the first
order of business is to create a
system. What we've recommended is
the Governor's Waste Management
Boa rd.
£ £.' That comment brings us to some of
the specific Task Force recommendations.
Greeriberg: The main theme we are trying to
emphasize is prevention. That means
the state has to invest some money
in research, to invest in technology
to assist and advise the waste
generators, and to conduct continuing
education through workshops,
symposia and other forms of education
to help waste generators know how
to manage waste: how to prevent
it if at all possible; if they
can't prevent it then to recycle it;
if they can't do either one then to
dispose of it as safely as possible,
Greeriberg: It's a nice suggestion that will
not mean a thing. If you take out
a pack of cigarettes and examine it,
it says: "Warning -- smoking is
dangerous to your health." This
hasn't prevented many people from
smoking. So if you put on a battery
or a bar of soap that this is a
waste-related product, this isn't
going to change a person's life-
styl e.
£ £j Why did the Task Force recommend a
board to coordinate present agencies
involved in waste management, rather
than a separate agency to oversee
all aspects of the problem?
Greeriberg: There are at least seven or eight
departments in state government
now that by statute have some
authority for waste management. If
you're going to create one super-
board, you practically have to
reorganize state government, re-
write all these state laws. This
might take two years to study.
Moreover, you might end up with the
kind of situation that we now have
with the Department of Energy. All
or most of what the Department has
done is regulation; it really hasn't
done much toward contributing to the
solution of the energy problem. In
order to avoid a whole reorganization
of state government, we're trying
to create a board with a little bit
of power and authority that will be
able to pull together the present
power that state agencies have.
£ £_: The Task Force has recommended that
the private sector take the lead
responsibility in selecting and
operating hazardous waste facilities.
Greeriberg: In terms of either a burial facility
or an incineration facility, I
think the state is least qualified
to act as operator. Then you'd
have state agencies supervising
other state agencies. It's much
better if you can get the private
sector to enter the field. There
are dozens of companies in this
business who have the experience,
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the expertise and the knowledge.
For example, Barnwell in South
Carolina has had a low-level radio-
active burial site some fifteen
years now, operated by Chem-
Nuclear Systems. The same company
also operates some hazardous and
toxic substance disposal sites
under a subsidiary, Chem Security.
They're my idea of one of the
better and more reliable companies.
a p_: Do you think the background of the
waste facilities companies should
be investigated before they're
allowed into North Carolina?
Greenberg : The companies should be investigated
inside and out, backwards and
forwards. There's one company that
is reputed to be controlled by the
Mafia. They came into this state
asking for a storage facility and
some kind of treatment facility. I
understand state officials
investigated and found there was no
truth to the syndicate allegation.
But it is true that this company
has been cited by EPA on a heckuva
lot of violations. So it has a
clouded history. Whether it should
have been licensed or not is not
my concern.
That is one company that has raised
some questions. There are other
companies however, for example
V/aste Management Corporation, that
have the resources to do the kinds
of things we're talking about.
There's also a company that runs
a ship, Vulcanus, owned by the
Dutch, which will, on contract,
incinerate waste far out at sea.
This is why we're recommending the
private sector. We don't want the
state supervising its own facility.
The best thing would be to have a
private firm do it, and have the
state supervise and do all the
necessary checking on it. That is
exactly the way the Barnwell site
is operated, and South Carolina is
very happy with that operation.
What South Carolina is unhappy
about is that the entire country is
using it as a dumpsite.
£_ p_: That's a fear some people have
expressed about a North Carolina
facility. The courts have ruled
that radioactive and hazardous
wastes are included in free inter-
state trade laws; a state with a
facility may not legally refuse
other states' waste.
Greenberg: Congress passed last December the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act of
1980. I t goes into effect
January 1, I986. It authorizes
states to band together to form
mutual compacts with exclusionary
powers. Right now, South Carolina
has already taken the lead to form
such a compact with seven adjacent
states. Obviously, if we join
them, South Carolina's going to
want some quid pro quo. They' 1
1
say we want North Carolina or
Tennessee or some other state to
have a suitable back-up facility.
The Act applies, however, only to
low-level radioactive waste. Right
now there is no authority to bar
any state from bringing its waste
to any other facility. The
National Governors Association has
recommended that the President and
Congress pass legislation similar
to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Act so that toxic and hazardous
substances can also be handled the
same way.
The problem is it's a Catch-22
situation. Without that legislation,
any state that takes the lead runs
the risk of becoming the dumping-
ground of the nation. That's what
happened at Barnwell. On the other
hand, if the state doesn't start
doing something now, and this
legislation is passed, then it's
left out in the cold. So you can't
go too fast and you can't go too
slow. V/hat do you do? We feel
that we better have some sort of
waste management system in place,
that we better be able to move
quickly when action is needed.
c £_: Though emphasizing prevention and
minimization of wastes, the Task
Force has determined that a
facility is needed for final
disposal of materials which can
not be further treated or reduced
in volume. The Task Force
conclusion that this facility
should be a landfill has been
hotly disputed by citizens' groups
favoring above-ground storage.
Greenberg: In all of the literature that has
been published on the disposal of
low-level radioactive and hazardous
wastes, I have heard of nothing
about above-ground storage. After
the public hearing in Raleigh, a
member of our faculty, at my
request, called the Chief of the




Solid and Hazardous Waste Research
Division of the EPA. This is the
man who presumably knows more about
hazardous waste than anybody in the
country. I'm reading now from a
note that was written to me by this
faculty member: "He was not aware
of any research or anyone proposing
that hazardous waste be stored
above-ground as a means of disposal.
He suggested that above-ground
storage, such as warehouses, storage
tanks and bunkers, are part of the
problem, and not a solution to
managing these materials. He
suggested that security requirements,
weather, unusual storms (including
lightning, for example), fire,
increased temperature of contents,
greater reactivity, and deterioration
of the container would only mitigate
against this alternative." I think
above-ground storage would be
probably the worst hazard imaginable
for any waste that's ignitable or
corrosive. One of the worst
accidents that ever happened was in
Elizabeth, New Jersey, where they
were storing ignitable material and
there was a fire that killed
workers and caused millions of
dol 1 ars in damage.
One of the rationales for above-
ground storage is the ease of
recovering materials once this
becomes economically feasible.
Ah, that's different. I think
the first step is to classify the
material. If it can be incinerated
and destroyed, that would be the
best thing. I would certainly
never store anything above-ground
that was ignitable or corrosive.
Waste materials that are not
ignitable, PCBs for example, you
might be able to store for three
to five years in the hope that
technology will develop which will
enable us to destroy or neutralize
the substances. Above-ground
might be better in that case. In
other words, it's merely a temporary
storage. It's not above-ground
storage in a perpetual sense. Also,
you would never use it for long-
life low-level radioactive waste,
but you would use it for those
materials where you hope the
technology would improve. If you
keep looking at this stuff pile
up day in and day out, it gives you
more impetus and encouragement to
try and push resources to find out
how to detoxify it. On the other
c £.-
hand, it doesn't mean that when
the material is above ground,




What about fears of contaminating
the groundwater supply through
burial of the waste?
Greeriberg: We don't want to put anything in
the ground that's going to
contaminate either surface or
below-ground water. That's the
problem with hazardous landfills.
But of course Love Canal and some
of those things were put in the
ground over thirty years ago
when there was very little known
about the technology of how to
site these things — geologically
and hydrolog ical
1
y . There's a lot
that's been learned since then. In
fact, the packaging is really clay.
In addition to impermeable barriers
of cement or some type of plastic,
you should place a certain type
of clay which is impermeable over
it. When burial is done properly,
as it is being done in some places
it should be relatively safe. But
nothing is perfectly safe. Nothing
is perfectly safe.
£2." Let's look at the very controversial
recommendation about pre-empting
local government authority. I
suppose you knew that it was going
to be a major source of contention.
Greenbevg: Of course. The final crunch comes
down to this. We're recommending
that everything be done if possible
to get sites by local cooperation.
By a site I don't mean necessarily
burial -- it could be above-ground
storage; it could be an incinerator;
it could be a recycling plant.
When we say treatment facility, we
don't always mean landfill burial.
If local zoning ordinances attempt
to prevent siting -- and we're
urging that every step possible be
taken to develop local cooperation
-- but if it becomes impossible
to get any 1 oca 1 i ty to be willing
to accept one of these, the state's
left with the responsibility. If
you're going to have responsibility,
you've got to have some authority.
We hope the override is never
invoked. In the same way, there's
an analogy in the field of Public
Health. If you have an infectious
disease -- say tuberculosis -- you're
infectious to your family, to your
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friends, to everybody you come in
contact with. Every effort is
made to persuade you to accept
care, to go to a treatment facility.
If you absolutely refuse, the local
Health Department has the police
power to obtain a court order to
send you to a treatment facility.
In the thirty-five years that I've
practiced Public Health in this
state, I know of only one or two
cases where the police power was
actually invoked. There was one
case locally where a recalcitrant
individual refused to go. But
the threat that he could be forced
to go was enough to convince him.
The police power is never invoked
unless it's absolutely necessary.
I would hope the same philosophy
would apply to this authority to
override "spot zoning" by local
ordi nance.
a p_: The Task Force has been severely
criticized for lacking sufficient
opportunity for public participation.
Does that surprise you?
Greenberg: That doesn't surprise me. I don't
think the persons who make the
criticisms are aware of what the
constraints are. The constraint is
that the Governor asked for the
report by early January. We asked
to extend those time limits by
five or six weeks, so we have
roughly until February 18 to make
the report. We've had public
hearings as much as we could. We've
invited the public to every meeting
-- every meeting of the Task Force
is open. I've invited public
comment at all of those meetings.
I and the two chairmen of the
technical advisory committees have
visited eight or nine newspapers
in the state; I've been giving
interviews to large numbers of
television stations and we've held
these seven public hearings through-
out the state. There's a limit to
what you can do and still get back
to the Governor by the time limit
in mind. This subject can go on
forever. What we need to do is to
have the Governor's Waste Management
Board created, and that Board can
continue to have public participation
and public hearing. You can go on
for public hearing forever and
you're not going to get agreement.
Nobody's going to come through and
say yes, I want a burial site on
my land.
In response to the Task Force draft report,
no group has been as vocal as the Protect Our
Piedmont Coalition. This league of citizens'
groups has captured media attention, shown up
in the hundreds at the Piedmont (Raleigh;
public hearing, and has filed an official
complaint with the Environmental Protection
Agency against the Task Force public
participation practices.
Bill Cummings is a long-term representative
of the Friends of Chapel Hill, the group which
organized the Coalition. He has worked as an
environmental consultant, and is now writing
his Ph.D. Dissertation on the ecology of
underdevelopment in the Phillipines.
caro Una planning
:
What is the "Protect Our
Piedmond Coalition"? Is it
basically a single issue group?
Cummings: The "Protect Our Piedmont
Coalition" was formed late this
fall, stimulated really by what we
were learning was going on in
Raleigh with the Governor's Task
Force. It's composed of environ-
mental, public interest, and poor
peoples' groups, largely Piedmont-
based. It has a number of concerns.
The principal area that it has been
working with right now has been
the Governor's Task Force. But
many of the groups involved have
had a long-standing interest in
nuclear waste, nuclear energy in
the state of North Carolina, and
the situation of toxic chemicals.
"Friends of Chapel Hill," the
group that I'm actually a
representative of, and that has
taken a lead role in organizing
the Coalition, is concerned with
broad environmental questions that
deal really with the future of
this area. We're beginning to
raise questions about how one can
live here in a sustainable way;
we're talking about the lcng-range
future. Some of the things that
are going on right now pose
irreversible threats, will bring
irreversible limitations to the
flexibility that we have in our
part of the Piedmont, and our
region of the biosphere in general.
"Friends of Chapel Hill" is made
up of lots of families who have
settled in and plan to raise their
children. Hence, our slogan and
one that was adopted by the
Coalition, "It's our home, not
their business."
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o_ p_: The Coalition has criticized the
Task Force for its handling of
public participation, and filed
an official complaint with EPA.
The Coalition in turn has been
criticized for not attending the c_ p_:
Task Force's open meetings, and for
not knowing what was going on. How
do you explain this contradiction?
Cummings: We've probably missed one, or two,
or maybe three meetings at the
most. We've had representatives
at most of them. Our complaint
wasn't whether or not we could be
at those meetings; our complaint
was that no one knew about those
meetings. Agendas weren't being
mailed out to the interested public
or the news media. 1 don't think
they were expecting any of the
public to come. We felt they Cummings:
should have done a better job of
letting people know.
Further, as we found out more about
the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, North Carolina was
also in violation, if not the letter
then the spirit, of the Act
itself and the public participation
guidelines: thirty to forty-five
days notice, depending on the type
of business that is going to be
discussed, and adequate dispersal
of relevant information. Clearly
the state failed to do that. Way
back in November, we began to
point out some of the more serious
flaws. In this most recent series
of public meetings, when those
weren't even spoken of or responded
to in any serious way by the Task
Force, we decided to make our
formal complaint.
e p_: Do you think a lot of the problems
in public participation were due
to a lack of time?
Cummings: Lack of time, but I think behind
the lack of time was a lack of
willingness to bend the schedule.
The people were basically excluded a v_:
by that. The specific reason was
a lack of time, but the deeper
reason was a feeling that people
don't really need to be involved.
Some of the Task Force staff share
with me the feeling that the people Cummings:
of North Carolina were lucky to get
as much as they did. The Task
Force claims it is a special case
and doesn't have to meet the
RCRA guidelines. We felt that if
the state was indeed sincere in
involving the people, then it
should have really made a complete
effort, bent over a little bit to
do that.
Let's talk about your critique of
specific Task Force recommendations.
In the Coalition's January 13
press statement, you said: "The
Governor's Task Force gave little
attention to the real problem of
hazardous waste: curbing new and
continued generation of the waste."
Yet the very first recommendation
in the draft report is that the
proposed waste management system
should "emphasize prevention,
resource conservation and recovery."
These statements have a lot in
common
.
There are parts of the Task Force's
work that we agree with. One of
our most basic critiques is that
the teeth of these recommendations
don't exist when one reads the
report at a deeper level. On both
the prevention of waste generation,
and the minimization of the wastes
themselves, the Task Force says
the right words but unfortunately
it's more lip-service than reality.
The Task Force has pages and pages
to say about a landfill or disposal
site, and virtually nothing to say
about either minimizing or recycling
the wastes. About the closest they
get is suggesting a "Governor's
Award for Excellence." Somehow
that's supposed to make all of this
work out. So we felt that the
real thrust of the report was calling
for a landfill, and paying lip-
service to other recommendations.
We also felt that the landfill idea
itself was a shoddy one, and one
that many technical people, as well
as citizens concerned with safety,
would take exception to. We found
wide support for the call for
above-ground storage.
Why has the Coalition stated that
"Underground burial is the cheapest,
quickest, and most dangerous
method of hazardous and low-level
radioactive waste disposal"?
None of these technologies are
certain. They are evolving;
there's a great deal no one knows
about any of them. The Task Force
and many of the state officials
continually would say: "Well,
this is going to meet EPA guide-
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lines. We don't have to worry
about that part of it -- we are
going to do what they say." When
one goes a step deeper, one finds
that the EPA itself isn't sure
what to say, and maybe isn't saying
the right thing according to some
people. Underground disposal is
certainly the cheapest, and the
simplest. It's basically a hole,
and the stuff is out of sight and
out of mind.
This relates in part to another
thing we feel doesn't receive
adequate emphasis from the Task
Force, the fact that 'disposal'
may indeed be the wrong word. For
many of these things, there isn't
any disposing of them at all.
Many of the radioactive materials
and indeed some of the chemical
ones remain toxic, remain radio-
active for thousands of years.
'Disposal' may give a false sense
of confidence, of security. Just
a few days before the January 19
Task Force meeting, the Council on
Environmental Quality announced
that, according to their study,
thirty-two states are now experiencing
severe groundwater contamination.
The likely cause, they felt, was
industrial dumping that's finally
appearing in the groundwater. Well,
as far as we're concerned, that's
permanent. We feel that below-
ground storage is just a way of
getting the stuff out of sight.
There's no telling what it's
going to do down there.
o_ £.* What about fire and security risks
of above-ground storage?
Cummings: We think the security risks posed
by above-ground only look greater
because we haven't considered the
full dimensions of the long-term
security risks posed to one of our
most basic needs -- clean water --
that are posed by putting wastes
underground
.
Moreover, if we take the optimistic
view about our technological
prowess, there may turn out to be
ways to detoxify some of these
things later, and indeed some of
them may become worth something.
3y storing them and monitoring them,
they'll be around to detoxify or
to use.
It may well be that the cost of
storing some of these things
above-ground, I mean the real cost
of safety, is so high that a lot
of products that are being
consumed now -- i f one were to pay
the full cost -- would be too
expensive for anyone to buy. But
we're all in favor of finding out
what those products are.
a_ £_• What do you think about requiring
product labels to disclose product-
related hazardous wastes?
Cummings: That would be one part of a much
broader critique and alternative
program that we intend to raise.
Much of our criticism has not
been directed to just the Task
Force itself, but to the Governor.
The Task Force in reality was
given a very limited charge. It
wasn't to look at what happened in
the past; it wasn't to look so
much at the generation of waste;
it wasn't to look at what sort of
industries should come to North
Carolina; it was given a very
tiny portion. Unfortunately, no
one else in the state was given
any of the other portions in an
effective way. There never has
been a coordinated and comprehensive
look at past, present, and future
hazards to people living in North
Carol ina.
So, part of our concern has been
with the Governor's industrial
development policy, including
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the Department of Commerce. It
doesn't make much sense to talk
about protecting the public from
hazardous waste as long as we
continue to be the most aggressive
state in seeking out and soliciting
toxic waste generators. It's a
contradiction. As alternatives,
we feel there are lots of creative
directions. We could be a real
leader instead of chasing a
probably false idea; instead of
chasing after other states.
a_2J Do you believe North Carolina
should have any hazardous or low-
level radioactive disposal sites?
Cwnmings: We may accept, and perhaps have a
responsibility to accept, low-
level waste generated by medical
research and medical treatment
and present corporations. But
we're not prepared to accept waste
generated by the nuclear industry,
by utilities, which, if plans that
exist now are completed, will
steadily increase. There are other
groups in the Coalition that may
not endorse that in exactly the
same way. I guess that overall,
as a coalition, and as a group of
concerned citizens our feeling is
that these are the kinds of questions
that North Carolinians want to
participate in, and our biggest
complaint is that they haven't had
that chance.
As for hazardous waste sites, I
guess in some ways the answer would
be the same. We have a responsibility
--
I think people are willing to
shoulder it in North Carolina --
for wastes that are presently being
produced. But it's a responsibility
that I think many people are not
prepared to accept without knowing
at the same time that they have
some power; that they're going to
play a full role in a dialogue
with our state leaders about what
kind of future we're going to have
here. It may be desirable to
phase some industries out. In the
last few years North Carolina has
made somewhat of a shift in its
industrial mix, as a result of what
kinds of industries are being
attracted. Examples are a number
of companies that essentially
produce for the auto industry,
producers of metal -pi at i ng and so
forth. Well, there's a question
as to whether North Carolinians
should bear the cost of such pro-
ducts when the benefits are really
enjoyed by people outside the state.
It's the same with Carolina Power
and Light in the situation with
hazardous radioactive waste. That
company is owned largely by people
outside the state. So there's a
question of equity involved as well.
All these things are related to the
question of whether people will
accept a radioactive or toxic waste
d i sposal site.
c_ £_: Assume we have this responsibility,
for the time being at least, and a
facility needs to be set up. What
about the condemnation issue? The
Coalition stated "No state agency
should have the right to condemn
land for a hazardous waste site."
Would anyone willingly accept a
site in their backyard?
Cummings : V/e ' re not sure. We do feel though
that as it stands now they probably
wouldn't. That should be a good
message for some of our policy-
makers to get. People in state
government seem to think the reason
that people are scared is that they
don't have the information, that
it's complex technology, and that
people don't have the brains to
make competent decisions. We reject
that logic. There are technical
aspects to it, but it's not a
technical decision. It's a
decision that any citizen has both
the right, and the legitimate
ability, to be involved in. We
think more than just fear is the
fact that people are not satisfied
with the state's or private
industry's ability to speak to
their needs. The state has
consistently failed in North
Carolina to protect the public from
both chemical and radioactive
hazards, and in the few cases where
there have been emergencies, has
dramatically demonstrated its in-
competence, for example with the PCBs.
£ £•' What, then, is the proper role for
the government in waste management?
Cummings: That's a good question, one we think
needs a lot more talk. Essentially
the Task Force is throwing it off
to the so-called private sector.
It's interesting that some real
problems were revealed in the way
the state would do even that. Three
days before the new RCRA guidelines
went into effect, the state







granted a permit to the SCA
Corporation in Mecklenberg County
to begin a treatment facility for
hazardous waste. Well, SCA has
been indicted, implicated and
connected to the Mafia by grand
juries and by reputable newspapers
all over the country. The state
has been totally irresponsible in
its evaluation of private industry
in the area of waste management so
far. The Department of Commerce
has been required for three years
to do environmental evaluations
of new firms coming into North
Carolina, and has never done that.
That was pointed out to them and
their answer was, well we haven't
done it -- you're right -- and
probably what we should do is get
rid of the law. That's the kind of
cavalier attitude towards the public
trust that they take. Right now
the state has no comprehensive body
that is charged with the protection
of the environment in general.
What incentives would persuade
private industry to deal adequately
with the hazardous waste problem?
I don't know if it's a question of
incentives or of sanctions and
penalities — probably a mixture of
both. Tax incentives, for example,
could minimize the amount of waste
produced, by encouraging recycling
and so forth. It may be just a way
of forcing them to accept good
common sense. A recent article in
Forbes magazine pointed out the
fortune to be found in wastes. I
think many corporations are
realizing that — that'll go a long way.
One of the Task Force recommendations
was a misdemeanor penalty for some
violations. We feel there needs
to be much stronger teeth. We've
seen with the PCB dumping episode
that we're left very vunerable and
unable to respond legally in any
way that would ultimately send a
message to industry to prohibit
further instances of that kind of
i rrespons i bi 1 i ty
.
What about the question of liability?
We're in favor of strict liability.
The argument against that is that
certain industrial practices would
become prohibitively expensive
because of high insurance costs.
Our response is that if the insurance
companies won't insure it, then
maybe it's not the kind of thing we
want to see happening in our state.
Indeed, if we're going to have the
continued production and use of
these poisons, the least the public
can expect is that if there's
damage, the measure of liability
should be quite strict. One doesn't
have to prove negligence.
e £_: What is your assessment of how
serious North Carolina's waste
management problem is right now.
How essential is it that we take
act i on?
Cummings: Every indication we get is that our
awareness of present problems rela-
ted to hazardous waste and nuclear
waste in the state is really just
the tip of the iceberg. There's
some controversy within state
government itself about the extent
of past dumping sites. The Eckhardt
Committee reported on 125 sites
in North Carolina, twenty of which
they considered to be serious health
threats. At a meeting the other
day, of the Triangle J Hazardous
Waste Subcommitte, the chairman
referred to santary landfills as
miniature Love Canals in them-
sel ves
.
We think that North Carolina was
spared the kinds of problems now
facing other states; but the state
has not been nearly as aggressive
as it should be in taking care of
past problems, in identifying them.
In many ways, we think the state
has acted to try to reassure the
public, but isn't prepared to take
the kinds of actions or adopt the
kinds of measures that would
provide real safety to its citizens.
We're hoping that many of our concerns
will be included in the final draft
of the Task Force report. Our
experience would lead us to believe
that this may be an unreasonable
hope. Nevertheless we continue to
believe that people can affect and
have some impact on their government.
If not, we'll take the next step
at some future date. I guess the
message we have sent so far is that
we're going to be involved one way
or another, and we'll do i t on our
terms, not theirs. It's our home
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Barking Up The Right Tree?
Wood as an alternative energy source
appeals to a wide segment of American consumers
for a variety of reasons: it requires low tech-
nology systems to produce energy; it is a re-
plenishable resource; and it is relatively cost
efficient. In many ways, wood as an alternative
energy source is a godsend. Under the right
conditions, it permits self-sufficiency and
saves money. The use of wood is tempered though,
by environmental, health and safety considera-
tions. It is important not to let the benefits
of heating with wood obscure the very real
environmental hazards inherent in wood energy
use. Uncontrolled, the highly concentrated
pollutants emitted by wood combustion can only
hasten the deterioration of environmental con-
ditions. In addition, it is unrealistic to
assume that wood supplies will remain stable
given the current pace at which wood burning
is escalating. The use of wood as an alter-
native energy source demands some government
attention. Wood energy users might also
benefit from instruction regarding the use of
this valuable resource.
COSTS
The appeal of residential wood heating to
consumers is attributed to three features:
attractive appearance of wood stoves, renew-
ability, and cost savings of wood. Cost savings
are probably the strongest incentive for
heating with wood.
The cost of a wood burning stove can
range anywhere from seventy-five to eleven
thousand dollars, depending on the design.
An airtight stove with a thermostatically con-
trolled damper can be purchased for three to
four hundred dollars. Adding installation and
inspection, the initial cost reaches five
hundred dollars. Payoff in terms of lower
heating bills increases the benefits of wood
hea t i ng
.
"cost savings are probably the strongest
incentive for heating with wood."
Local costs of conventional fuel and wood
are crucial factors in calculating the wisest
heating choice. In rural areas a cord of wood
can frequently be bought for as little as
thirty dollars, and can sometimes be acquired
for no cost if the user is willing to cut his
own. Inaccessibility and ensuing transportation
costs make wood a questionable bargain for the
urban dweller. The cost of wood is already
prohibitive in many urban areas.
SAFETY
An important consideration in the selection
and installation of wood stoves is safety. Wood
stoves are either radiant or circulating.
Radiant heaters have a single wall that acts as
both the fire box and the outside surface of
the heater. Circulating heaters have a second
wall which surrounds the fire box, reducing tho
danger of burns. Southern Building Code Congress
International and the Building Official Code
Administration specify safety points for stove
installation which address location, clearances
for shielded and unshielded materials, flue
pipes, and chimneys.
Creosote build-up is the most common cause
of chimney fires. Creosote is the condensation
of unburned gases and tar-like liquids on the
chimney interior. The amount of creosote which
forms in a chimney is affected by moisture con-
tent of the wood, height of the chimney, flue
gas temperature, firing rate, ambient air
temperature and humidity, and air setting. Re-
ducing the smoke emitted is of primary impor-
tance for creosote reduction and can be achieved
by allowing more air into the fire at the
sacrifice of some of the stove's efficiency.
The following factors reduce the hazards
associated with residential wood burning:
1. permits for the installation of wood
heating devices;
2. installation inspection by a certifi-
ed National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
i nspector
;
3. annual chimney inspections where
permits have been issued;
h. installation of smoke alarms and
fire extinguishers at the time of initial stove
instal lat ion ; and
,
5. safety and installation workshops by
NFPA to be sponsored and publicized by re-
ta i lers
.
Ultimately, the issue of safety in the use
of wood heating appliances rests with the in-
dividual operator. Cooperation between the re-
tailer (in selling the stove best suited to the
buyer) and the manufacturer (in distributing
guidelines for safe stove use) should contri-
bute to safe and wise use.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
Burning wood emits both particulate and
gaseous pollution. Particulates in wood smoke
are liquid or solid particles ranging from micro-
scopic to easily visible. They are due to the
incomplete combustion of wood. Of the many
compounds which exist in the organic fraction
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of particulates, polycyclic organic matter (POM)
is the best known. Harmful POM compounds include
carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and volatile
hydrocarbons (EPA, 1980).
Emissions from woodburning stoves are
categorized as criteria or noncriteria.
Ambient air quality standards (AAQS) exist for
criteria emissions; several of the noncriteria
emissions, which can be environmentally
hazardous, are left unmonitored (Kieron, et.
al., 1979)- Surveys and modeling studies
suggest a significant air quality impact from
residential wood combustion sources as early as
1976. As a result, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) is considering new air quality
standards which would regulate emissions from
residential wood combustion sources. They are
currently exempt from state and local air
pollution control regulations. The Clean Air
Act Amendment of 1977 requires that all newly
installed wood stoves in nonatta i nment areas
incorporate pollution control technology that
will yield the lowest possible emission rates.
W.D. Snowden's EPA report, "A Preliminary
Study of Woodburning Stove Emissions," offers
a thorough analysis of residential wood combus-
tion. During the stable burning cycles emission
levels are influenced by wood type and moisture
content, firing rate, stove design and excess
air ratio. Education of the residential wood
burner is the first step in reducing emission
levels, as the conditions which keep emission
levels low are controlled by the stove operator.
Organic compounds, trace elements, and
certain gases in combination with fine particu-
lates can have serious health effects even in
low concentrations. Pollutants in a stagnant
air mass can accumulate to levels which are
especially hazardous for individuals with
respiratory problems. Communities are just
beginning to express apprehension about the
adverse health effects of wood burning stoves.
If a large number of people grow to depend
on residential wood combustion as their primary
heat source, instances of acute air pollution
will intensify. Exposure to the pollutants
attributable to wood combustion needs to be
studied over time and in different regions to
evaluate the health impacts accurately. The
potential health risks of priority and carcino-
genic pollutants from smoke, however, need
immediately to be drawn to public attention.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Health, safety and environmental impacts
of the use of wood as an energy source indicate
the need for public education and government
regulation.
Short courses in wood lot management,
safety, emissions control and efficiency
should be strongly encouraged by local EPA
offices. Retailers should advertise and make
available this information, and perhaps offer
workshops themselves. Tax incentives could be
provided if necessary. Wood stove permits
should be required, their issuance contingent
upon passage of a wood burning stove operator's
exami nat ion
.
All wood stove manufacturers should be
required to develop an emissions test program
to determine the pollution efficiency of their
products before marketing. An important step
toward reducing emission levels and promoting
the redesign of wood stoves, would be to
include wood heater emissions in the ambient
air baseline. Attachment devices, such as
catalytic converters, for use on wood stoves
already in operation should be encouraged.
Given the tremendous growth of the
industry in recent years, adoption of some
responsibility for air quality degradation by
wood stove manufacturers is not unreasonable.
If wood combustion source emissions continue
to go unmonitored, the likely outcomes for all
wood-using industries are increased control
and reduced growth. These results are inequit-
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